At least eight components will be involved in running 'London Rail' - two responsible for signalling, two for infrastructure maintenance, two for infrastructure renewals, one for train and station operations and another for train maintenance.

Many of the operational and safety problems identified in a study of the plans, by Peter Rayner, would not exist if the franchise was to be run directly by London Underground, says the former manager of British Rail's biggest region.

However, Transport for London intends that the ELL's operations are taken from London Underground and handed, along with the North and West London lines, to privateer MTR Laing.

Mr Rayner's study says that the unnecessarily complex relationships between the franchisee, TfL, Network Rail, private contractor Metronet and its own army of subcontractors, raise a catalogue of concerns.

"There is no doubt the fragmented nature of the arrangements does make it more difficult to manage operationally and importantly more difficult to manage safely," Mr Rayner concludes.

Mr Rayner, who has been an expert witness in 50 cases and gave evidence at the Southall and Ladbroke Grove inquiries, draws on lessons from the Tebay and Edge Hill accidents.

Proposals to remove guards on the North and West London lines also raise safety fears because driver-only operation is not able to deal with passenger interface issues, says Mr Rayner.

He cites examples of serious accidents and fatalities caused by passengers being trapped in doors and trains train moving off, and says that the considerable cost of making DOO safe probably outweigh any of its claimed advantages.

Commenting on the study at RMT's annual conference in Edinburgh, general secretary Bob Crow said today:

"Peter Rayner's report underlines the fears we have that privatisation of the East London Line will undermine safety.

"It seems that precious few lessons have been learned from the nightmare fragmentation of national rail privatisation or the disastrous part-privatisation of Tube infrastructure, because the same dangerous formula is being lined up for London Rail.

"It is still not too late to step back from this grave mistake and keep the East London Line's operations as a unified part of the Tube network."

ends

Notes to editors: Peter Rayner's study follows, and a biography of Peter Rayner is appended at the end.

EAST LONDON LINE - Report on the factors surrounding the operation of the proposed London Rail Concession.

By Peter Rayner, FCILT FIRO Associate of the IRSE MCIM

INTRODUCTION

I have completed my examination of the proposals for the East London Line (ELL) and there is no doubt the fragmented nature of the arrangements does make it more difficult to manage operationally and importantly more difficult to manage safely.

I have examined the London Rail Concession Invitation to Tender documentation and the Annexes thereto of which there are 16 plus an Appendix of Terms.

As is always the case that documentation provides a solution to all likely contingences and taken in conjunction with Safety Case provision, in a perfect world it would work.

All Safety Case and performance criteria works if there are sufficient staff, adequately trained, properly supervised and regularly audited. Sadly in the fragmented railway of today the system sometimes fails. Examples of where the fragmented system has failed include Tebay and Edge Hill - but one could also quote Southall, Hatfield, Potters Bar and of course Ladbroke Grove all of which from Expert Witness Reports for Criminal Court Proceedings and the Public Inquiries show fragmentation to be a contributory factor in the incidents.

FRAGMENTATION

Professor Uff QC who chaired the Southall accident Public Inquiry made reference to fragmentation being an issue. However, the most firm evidence came from Gerald Corbett, Chief Executive of Railtrack and was given before the House of Commons Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee on 1 November 2000 and was subsequently reflected in their Report (106).

Mr Corbett said, "Managing safety on the railway is about managing a whole set of inter relationships; because on the one hand you have got growth, on the other hand you have got the requirements for better train performance, and you have got safety, and they are all in conflict and they need to be held in balance. And since Privatisation, when the railway was fragmented, it has, I believe, become harder to actually to manage that balance."

Despite that comment it is important to remember that over many years we have had services working together as BR/LUL, each with running over powers, running on each others infrastructure.

Two cases in point, Harrow on theHill to Amersham with LUL infrastructure and Chiltern Line trains working over andQueens Park to Harrow and Wealdstone, Network Rail infrastructure with LUL working over. A degree of cooperation has always been possible and only the failures of the last 10 years of privatisation and confusion have called that into question.

It needs to be realised that the arrangements that existed worked primarily because there were only two organisations (LUL/BR) which was a manageable overlap with experienced time serving directly employed staff.

I have reviewed a number of Services bearing the fragmentation and unclear organisational issues in mind, because any criticism that is levelled about this proposal will be met by examples like the Thameslink Services (now called First Capital Connect) which is demonstrably complicated. It operates over 3 different Regions and Regional Controls on Network Rail; it operates its own stations, uses LUL stations (Farringdon), Network Rail stations (egLondon Bridge), Southern stations (egEast Croydon) and even South West Trains stations (Wimbledon). It runs intermixed with Midland Main Line, South East Trains, Southern and Gatwick Express. It leases its trains from a ROSCO and has yet another contract with Southern to maintain those trains at Selhurst. Such an arrangement is a prime example of how not to run a railway. Add the infrastructure maintenance fragmentation to that matrix and it can be seen how foolish it is.

It can be demonstrated quite clearly the lack of control of safety by fragmentation, particularly where contractors and sub-contractors are concerned. The prevailing system appears to require the contractee to only ensure that the contractor next in the supply chain has the necessary competence and systems to carry out the work safely and so on down the chain of sub and sub-sub contractors.

In effect, the contracting entity only directly manages the contractor next below and requires that body to manage anything below that and so on down the line. It is for debate whether this issue has been addressed adequately by previous accidents, and alterations made to prevent a recurrence, and whether this shortcoming has been addressed in the proposed organisational structure and systems proposed for the ELL.

For ELL to have good safety and operational management there would be a need for one organisation to have primacy which is not clear from the proposals I have examined. A clear chain of command would be needed that works even with different levels belonging to different organisations. The roles, responsibilities and decision making powers must be clearly spelled out within the chain and the organisation involved must sign off acceptance. This is not easy with everyone looking to defend their own organisations and shifting blame.

DRIVER ONLY OPERATION (DOO)

I have noted Annex 14 in which it states:

Tfl anticipates the implementation of a system that will support DOO operation on the NLL and WLL by December 2011.

It states later:

Bidders can set out proposals to broaden the scope of DOO or bring forward its implementation.

I have reviewed the principle of DOO and list below some points for consideration.

* DOO Equipment is costly and depends upon the type of Unit, Driver position, Cab layout and curvature of platform.
* LUL (TfL) are developing Radio Contact system "Connect" which is being rolled out piecemeal.
* LUL (TfL) requirements are based upon the close proximity of stations and the full staffing of those stations. It is not clear what requirements will obtain on this Heavy Rail and Sub Surface line.
* DOO on NR if correctly staffed and equipped can deal with train operational safety but NOT with passenger interface issues.
* Examples exist on NR where Drivers sometimes open and shut doors in minimal time and without a proper examination of train side.
* Examples exist on NR of fatal accidents caused by persons being trapped in doors and train moving off.
* Examples exist on NR of parties of schoolchildren being separated by train departing DOO with only half of the party of thirty on board.

The DOO costs on the Surface railway as illustrated by Thameslink and the South Eastern are considerable and probably outweigh many of the claimed advantages. There is increased manning on curved platforms, high cost of maintenance of TV equipment. In the case of staff on platforms many are not PTS (Personal Track Safety) trained and therefore cannot go on to the track in an emergency which conflicts with present LUL practice

It cannot be argued that DOO itself is unsafe. However it can be examined as to how cost effective it is to make it safe. If the South Eastern application is looked at there are heavy staffing requirements at Waterloo East, London Bridge (SE) and other busy stations with curved platforms which CCTV cannot safely cope with.

Another problem with even straight surface level platforms is low sunlight (morning and evening) and lighting levels themselves. The quality of CCTV has improved dramatically but the equipment itself needs maintenance and cleaning which is another high cost.

The costs therefore of DOO on the ELL, a relatively small railway, are likely to be very high in equipment and Control Centre arrangements and it needs to be carefully considered what other advantages may be obtained with more on train staff or fully manned properly qualified station platform staff.

SUMMARY

From my examination of the proposal there are two major areas of concern with both Safety and Cost implications.

1. Fragmented Maintenance

The Edge Hill and Tebay examples illustrate the problems of the contractor, sub contractor and sub-sub contractor issues i.e. examples of where five of six organisations are involved in one worksite or the setting up of unauthorised worksites, the failure to plan and document the work.

Unless this sort of confusion is addressed the entire question of "in house" maintenance is questionable. Correct levels of staff, correct training, correct audit and correct supervision are essential. The present known problems with the PPP proposals makes continuing with it, in my view, an action that places TfL and Network Rail being at variance with their Safety Case.

2. Fragmented Operation exacerbated by DOO

From the list of examples it is my view that not only is DOO more costly but it also poses operational difficulties not questioned in today's railway simply because in strict operating terms it is safe. With the passenger interface however it is less safe.

If there is to be DOO it should be with directly operated LUL staff, fully manned stations and to LUL standards. To start to implement a bastardised form of DOO to suit the ELL is in my view unsafe and uneconomical.

The proposed method of working for the ELL is fragmented and a difficult way to run a railway. The opportunity to provide Vertical Integration and run where possible on TfL infrastructure and TfL Staff on stations and trains and with TfL ownership of those trains has been lost.

Many of the problems would not exist if LUL were given the Franchise to run directly.

CONCLUSION

The East London Line as proposed involving Network Rail, LUL, TfL, Metronet and the sub contractors of Metronet and the franchisee, MTR Laing I consider will be difficult to manage both operationally and safely and could result in incidents similar to those illustrated in this Report and its Appendices

P.G. RAYNER FCILT FIRO Associate of the IRSE MCIM

Peter Rayner - biography

Peter Rayner started as a junior on the railway in 1951 at Cambridge. After becoming a Station Master, he was accepted as a Traffic Apprentice in 1959 and went on to hold a range of key positions with British Rail - culminating in operating BR's biggest Region, the London Midland from 1986 until 1991.

After a further spell at BR HQ he retired in 1992. Since then he has run a Consultancy, giving advice on rail operations and safety, as well as lecturing, broadcasting and writing. He had a book published in 1997, "On and Off the Rails" and was one time Adviser to the Select Committee for Transport.

He has acted as an Expert Witness in over fifty cases including criminal cases at the Old Bailey, Luton, Liverpool and Newcastle Crown Courts and given evidence at the Southall Accident Inquiry and the three Ladbroke Grove Inquiries conducted by Lord Cullen.

Peter Rayner is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport, a Fellow of the Institution of Railway Operators, an Associate of the Institution of Signal Engineers and Member of Institute of Management.