Evidence that legal documents were falsified to cover the fact that a strike-breaking signaller worked two shifts without the minimum eight-hour break between them has been passed to the railways inspectorate by RMT.

"It seems that Network Rail has once more put the lives of railway staff and passengers in second place to attempting to break a strike," RMT general secretary Bob Crow said today.

"Network Rail moved staff out of rostered positions in boxes unaffected by the strike to cover those that would not be staffed during the strike, and as a result struggled to keep the unaffected boxes adequately staffed.

"We understand that a non-RMT signaller who worked until 23:36 on March 4 at Sleaford East box then signed on for another duty at 06:50 on March 5 at Sleaford North.

"We also understand that the signaller signed off at Sleaford East at 22:30, but then carried on working and booking trains for another hour in an attempt to make it look like he had taken the minimum eight hours' rest.

"There are no circumstances in which anything less than an eight-hour turn-around is permissible, and it would have to have been OK'd by a manager.

"We are asking HMRI to investigate whether false entries have been made in the Train Register Book, which is a legal document," Bob Crow said.

ends

Note to editors: RMT is already awaiting the outcome of an investigation into an apparently serious signalling blunder during the first strike day, which could have resulted in rail traffic being sent through engineering works.

See also:

Quintinshill rail crash

Wikipedia:

The reason that false entries in the Train Register Book, a legal document, is regarded as a cardinal sin by signallers dates back to a terrible train crash in 1915 at Quintinshill.

The Quintinshill rail crash occurred on 22 May 1915, at Quintinshill, an intermediate signal box (on what is now the West Coast Main Line) with refuge loops on the Caledonian Railway near Gretna Green in Scotland. Involving five trains, the crash killed 227 people and caused by far the most casualties of any rail crash that happened in the UK. The accident is not well known because the majority of victims were soldiers and it occurred during World War I, when all news was subject to official censorship. A trial afterwards convicted two negligent railway workers of having caused the accident.

Diagram of the tracks and signals just prior to the accident

A distracted signalman forgot about a stationary local train that he had shunted on to the opposite running line to let a following express train through, as both adjacent sidings were already occupied. This led to a multiple collision between a troop train and the local train, also involving two coal trains in the sidings and, shortly afterwards, the following express train, which ploughed into the wreckage. In total, 227 people died and 246 were injured — of the 500 soldiers of the 7th Battalion of the Royal Scots on the troop train, only 60 made it to roll call the next morning. The precise number of fatalities is not known because the roll of the regiment was destroyed in the fire. The disaster was made much worse by fire caused by wooden carriages and gas lighting and the coal in one of the coal trains.

The accident took place at a change of shift: George Meakin had worked the night shift and was relieved by James Tinsley. These two men had an informal agreement whereby if the local train were stopping at Quintinshill, Tinsley would travel on it and start work half an hour late. Meakin would record all the details of that half hour on a piece of paper and then Tinsley would copy this into the train register when he arrived, to cover up his late arrival. This arrangement and chatter about war news distracted Tinsley so that he forgot about the local train on which he had himself arrived. Both signalmen had fallen into sloppy practices and neglected several standard safety procedures required by the rules.

The accident was exacerbated because one of the trains involved was a troop train. The heavy wartime traffic and a shortage of carriages meant that the railway company had to press into service obsolete Great Central Railway stock. These carriages had wooden bodies and frames, so had very little crash resistance compared with steel framed stock, and were gas-lit. The gas (oil-gas) was stored in reservoirs slung under the underframe. These reservoirs had just been charged and this, plus the lack of available water, kept the resulting fire burning for two days. It was reported at the time that not one lump of coal from the northbound coal train or the locomotives was found after the fire was extinguished, but this may be more down to exaggerated reporting than fact. The southbound coal train was returning empty wagons to South Wales: it was a Jellicoe Special serving the Royal Navy. The fire probably killed more people than the crash did.

The dead are buried in Edinburgh's Rosebank Cemetery on Pilrig Street.

The two signalmen, James Tinsley and George Meakin, were sentenced to three years and eighteen months in prison respectively for culpable homicide due to gross neglect of duties.

Lessons learned

The Quintinshill disaster would have been avoided if the line had been equipped with track circuits, which detect the presence of trains and prevent the signals being changed to "clear". However, as Quintinshill had good visibility from the signal box, it would have had low priority for the fitting of track circuits.

Quintinshill signal box was also supplied with "lever collars" – devices that should have been slipped over the signal levers to remind the signalmen not to move them until the obstruction had been cleared – but, despite written instructions, the signalmen had got out of the habit of using them. These lever collars are not automatic like track circuits, and hence are not foolproof, but remain in common use to this day.

It was noted that the fireman of the waiting train had failed to report to the signal box and remind the signalman that they were at a stand and ensure that the reminder collars were placed over the signal levers (in accordance with rule 55(g) when there are no track circuits). However, they may have wrongly regarded that, as the signalman had actually got off their train, that duty had been discharged.

The Board of Trade accident report concluded that if the signalmen had followed basic operating rules and used the safety devices provided, the accident would not have happened, and no recommendations for additional equipment or rule changes were necessary.

The trial

Meakin and Tinsley were the only signalmen in the UK to be actually given prison sentences for causing a crash. Others have been convicted of manslaughter but were discharged (e.g. Thirsk). However the level of culpability at Quintinshill was much higher, as the Lord Justice General's lucid summing up showed:

"...They gave the signal that the line was clear and the troop train might safely come on. At that moment there was before their very eyes a local train obstructing that line. One man in the signal box had actually left that train a few minutes before when it was being shunted. The other had a few minutes before directed the local train to go on to the up main line. If you can explain that staggering fact consistently with the two men having faithfully and honestly discharged their duties you should acquit them. If you cannot ... you must convict them."

The jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict in just eight minutes. Thomas (1969) lists eight separate ways in which the signalmen broke operating rules, mostly regularly, not just that morning.

It is interesting to note that as the incident occurred in Scotland and many of the fatalities occurred at the Carlisle main hospital just over the border in England, differences in Scottish and English law rendered the guilty pair indictable in both jurisdictions for manslaughter. Under Scottish law, it is the act that results in loss of life (regardless of where the actual death occurs) that has to occur on Scottish soil. However, under English law, it is the loss of life (regardless of where the fatal act occurs) that has to occur on English soil.

Similar accidents

The Hawes Junction rail crash of 1910 also involved a busy signalman forgetting about a train on the main line, but because the signalman there was extremely busy and fully focused on his job, his momentary lapse was more excusable. Likewise, at the Winwick rail crash of 1934, an overworked signalman forgot about a train in his section, and was misled by a junior. In neither case had track circuits been installed.

Chain of Responsibility

"Chain of Responsibility" is a system where safety is held to be the responsibility of an organisation as a whole and not just of those at the front line.

In the case of the Quintinshill accident, it raises the question "Why did the signalmen not ask for permission to vary the shift changeover times, and avoid the dangerous distraction of rewriting the train register?” If this had been allowed, the risk of an accident could have been reduced.

One can only suppose that management of the railway concerned would have considered such a request uppity if not a sackable offence. Their reasons for wanting to vary the changeover would have been seen as insufficient to justify exemption from the universal shift pattern.

External links

* Board of Trade accident report
* Website with the accident casuality listing reference only

See also

* List of rail accidents
* List of rail accidents in the United Kingdom
* List of British rail accidents by death toll
* List of United Kingdom disasters by death toll
* List of notable accidents and incidents on commercial aircraft
* Fatal Accident Inquiry

References

* Thomas, John (1969). Gretna: Britain's Worst Railway Disaster (1915). Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles. ISBN 0-7153-4645-8.
* Hamilton., J.A.B. (1967). British Railway Accidents of the 20th Century (reprinted as Disaster down the Line).. George Allen and Unwin / Javelin Books. ISBN 0-7137-1973-7.
* Nock, O.S. (1980). Historic Railway Disasters, 2nd ed., Ian Allan.
* Rolt, L.T.C. (1956 (and later editions)). Red for Danger. Bodley Head / David & Charles / Pan Books.